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Between Safety and Transparency:
Prior Restraints, FOIA, and the
Power of the Executive
by DEVIN S. SCHINDLER*
Introduction
The Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency
have in their possession a series of photographs taken at the Abu
Ghraib military prison that depict American soldiers torturing
detainees.! These photographs depict, among other things, an
American soldier sodomizing a handcuffed detainee with a broom.2
Nothing in the pictures is a secret; the fact that the United States
tortured detainees having long ago been disclosed by the media.3
Both Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama refused to
release these photographs to the media, arguing that the
dissemination of photographs showing the gross humiliation and
* Associate Professor of Constitutional Law, Thomas M. Cooley School of Law.
Professor Schindler received his J.D. from University of Michigan Law School, where he
graduated magna cum laude and Order of the Coif, and his B.A. from James Madison
College and the Honors College at Michigan State University.
1. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Dep't of Def., 543 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2008) (hereinafter
"ACLU v. DOD").
2. The Attorney General described some of the photographs in its Petition for
Certiorari from ACLU v. DOD, 543 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. granted, judgment vacated
at 130 S. Ct. 777 (2009) (mem.). This case, discussed in detail below, arose after the
government rejected a Freedom of Information Act request filed by the American Civil
Liberties Union seeking release of the photographs. Among other things, the government
conceded in its Petition for Certiorari that the photographs "include an image showing
several soldiers posing near standing detainees who are handcuffed to bars with 'sandbags
covering their heads' while a soldier holds a broom as if "sticking [its] end into the rectum
of a restrained detainee." 130 S. Ct. 777 (2009) (mem.) (Petition for A Writ of Certiorari
from ACLU v. DOD, 543 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2008)).
3. See infra notes 65-73 and text accompanying.
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degradation of militant Islamic prisoners at the hands of the
American military would result in violent acts of retaliation.' For
nearly five years, courts in the Second Circuit in the case American
Civil Liberties Union v Department of Defense,' struggled with the
Bush Administration's argument that withholding the pictures was
justified-despite the fact that they were not secret-because their
release would result in harm to America and its interests.
The Abu Ghraib situation is not unique. At any given time,
governments have in their possession volumes of highly inflammatory
material, such as crime scene photographs,' the details of military
operations,' the use of unmanned drones,' and technical data,9 which
contain inflammatory but ultimately "non-secret" information.
Release of this kind of information may not directly implicate the
government's legitimate interest in secrecy, but could have the long-
term effect of making the world less safe for American interests.
Inflammatory but nonconfidential information possessed by the
government has historically fallen into a statutory and legal void, not
4. ACLU v. DOD, 543 F.3d at 63.
5. Id.; see also Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Dep't of Def., 389 F. Supp. 2d 547
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
6. See, e.g., Michigan v. Mills, 537 N.W.2d 909 (1995) (discussing the evidentiary
standards for admission of inflammatory photographs of crime victim's injuries).
7. Most recently, the website wikileaks.org published approximately 76,000 military
reports on the day-to-day operations of coalition forces in Afghanistan. Afghan War
Diary, available at http://www.wikileaks.org/wiki/AfghanWar_.Diary,-2004-2010. The
website has been heavily criticized by the Obama Administration, which believes that the
leaked information will place troops serving in Afghanistan at risk. See, e.g., Stephen
Condon, White House Implores Wikileaks: Don't Post More Documents, CBS NEWS, July
30, 2010, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20012177-503544.html. As
a result, the broad outlines of many military operations undertaken in Afghanistan are no
longer "confidential." As stated by one military official, the "genie is out of the bottle."
Craig Whitlock, Pentagon Demands Wikileaks Return Documents, WASH. POST, Aug. 5,
2010, available at http://voices.washingtonpost.com/checkpoint-washington/2010/08/
pentagondemands wikileaksret.html?hpid=moreheadlines. That being the case, this
Article, among other things, addresses in further detail the President's inherent authority
to prevent the release of further information regarding these military operations,
notwithstanding the loss of confidentiality.
8. See, e.g., Obama Administration Must Disclose Information About Illegal Use of
Drones, http://www.aclu.org/national-security/obama-adminstration-must-disclose information
-about-illegal-use-drones (last visited Sept. 27, 2010).
9. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2278(a)(2) (2010) (allowing the withholding of technical data
that could injure national security interests).
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directly protected by statute but still potentially harmful to American
interests if released.'0
The absence of any specific statutory authority or case law has
resulted in a piecemeal and ultimately inconsistent approach to
situations where the government has sought to prevent the
dissemination of nonconfidential but inflammatory material. In the
Abu Ghraib situation, for example, shortly before the case was
scheduled to be heard by the Supreme Court, Congress passed
specific legislation directed solely at preventing the disclosure of the
pictures." Such an ad hoc approach is ultimately unsatisfying,
however, because it potentially undermines presidential authority and
results in a lack of certainty as to when disclosure is, and is not,
justified.
At its core, the debate over the release of this kind of
information places two irreconcilable constitutional values in direct
conflict. Protecting American lives is perhaps the most important of
all values.12  More amorphous, but equally important, is the
transparency and accountability that democracy and the First
Amendment demand." Efforts by the executive branch to prevent
the release of inflammatory but nonconfidential information place
our constitutional commitment to transparent government in direct
conflict with the President's duty to protect American interests. The
answer to resolving this tension lies not in divining "moral
imperatives" or "balancing" conflicting interests. Both sides to the
debate have more than legitimate arguments and can correctly cite to
any one of several constitutional values supporting their perspective.
At the constitutional level, the answer to the question of what to do
with inflammatory but nonsecret information lies in the debate over
presidential powers. Who makes the decision to suppress information
and why that decision was made are as important inquiries, in
constitutional terms, as the issue whether this kind of information
should be released at all.
10. See generally Stewart Harris, The First Amendment and the End of the World, 68
U. PITr. L. REv. 785 (2008) (providing a detailed discussion of this statutory void).
11. Pub. L. No. 111-83, § 565 (2009).
12. See, e.g., The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 638 (1862).
13. For a detailed discussion of the Founders' commitment to government
transparency, see DANIEL N. HOFFMAN, GOVERNMENTAL SECRECY AND THE
FOUNDING FATHERS: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS (1981).
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The immediate problem of what to do with the Abu Ghraib
photographs has now passed as a result of Congressional action.1
The underlying question of the scope of the President's authority to
prevent the release of inflammatory, nonconfidential information,
however, remains unresolved. Answering that question implicates
both the debate over Presidential powers, on one hand, and the depth
of our country's commitment to open government, on the other.
Ultimately, the manner in which both the lower courts and Congress
responded to the Abu Ghraib photographs threatens the plenary
authority granted to the President in areas touching upon war and
foreign affairs. In future situations analogous to the debate over the
Abu Ghraib photographs, the President should not be held at the
mercy of Congress, hoping for the proverbial eleventh hour stay of
execution. Rather, the President has the constitutional authority,
within limits to be discussed below, to prevent the release of this kind
of material."
Section I of this article will frame the debate by defining the kind
of "inflammatory material" over which the President should have the
final say. Section II further frames the debate by outlining the
current statutory and legal structure governing the release of
inflammatory material by government, with a particular focus on how
the three branches have treated the related subject of protecting
"confidential" information. The Abu Ghraib case is considered in
detail in Sections III and IV, highlighting how the Court misperceived
or otherwise ignored the serious separation of powers issues raised by
its decision(s) to order the release of the photographs. Section V
critiques the current system and outlines a path towards creation of
an "executive privilege" that would allow for some oversight of
executive decisions regarding the release of such material, without
sacrificing our country's commitment to transparency. Finally,
section VI proposes an analytical framework for future disputes,
using the Abu Ghraib situation as a "case study."
I. Inflammatory Material
What is inflammatory material? The revelation that a politician
hired a prostitute is certainly inflammatory, in the sense that it might
14. See Pub. L. No. 111-83, § 565 (2009).
15. Specifically, as will be argued below, the President's constitutional authority as
Commander in Chief encompasses the power to prevent the disclosure of information that
could be harmful to ongoing military actions. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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lead some to become "arous[ed] ... by strong emotion," 6 but few
would argue that there would be compelling safety justification to
limit its disclosure. On the other end of the spectrum lies the case
United States v. Progressive, Inc.17 In 1979, The Progressive, a political
magazine, was preparing to publish an article entitled "The H-Bomb
Secret."' Among other things, the article contained detailed but
nonconfidential technical descriptions and drawings showing how the
bomb was designed and worked. The government sought to restrain
the publication on the grounds that widespread dissemination of such
information could aid enemies of America in developing their own
nuclear capacity.' 9
The Court ultimately issued an order restraining the publication,
primarily because of the highly inflammatory information it
contained. 20 As stated by the Court, "[a] mistake in ruling against the
United States could pave the way for thermonuclear annihilation for
us all. In that event, our right to life is extinguished and the right to
publish becomes moot." 21
The Abu Ghraib photographs fell between this continuum. On
one hand, the photographs were most certainly more newsworthy but
also more likely to cause acts of violence than the disclosure of
infidelity by a public figure. On the other hand, the release of the
photographs was unlikely to lead directly to the potential harm that
animated the decision in the Progressive case. In this context, the
definition of "inflammatory information" that will be adopted for
purposes of this analysis comes from the Second Circuit in ACLU v.
DOD, which assumed but did not decide that the photographs "could
reasonably be expected to incite violence against United States
troops, other coalition forces and civilians... ."22
16. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY, 711 (4th ed. 2004).
17. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979), dismissed,
610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979).
18. Howard Morland, The H-Bomb Secret, THE PROGRESSIVE, Nov. 1979, at 14.
19. The magazine and its author claimed that the article simply synthesized
information that Morland lawfully found in the public domain and, therefore, was
nonconfidential. Id. at 3.
20. See Progressive, 467 F. Supp. at 996-97.
21. Id. at 996. Ironically, the article was published several months later when the
government agreed to dismiss its appeal following further public disclosures of the
information contained in the article; see also United States v. Progressive, 610 F.2d 819
(7th Cir. 1979).
22. ACLUv. DOD, 543 F.3d at 67 n.3.
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Applying this test here, to what extent can the Executive Branch
acting alone prevent the dissemination of newsworthy but nonsecret
information that could "reasonably be expected" to incite violence?
Court's have struggled for years to resolve this question, against the
backdrop of Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA").23 Ultimately,
courts, as well as Congress, have been unwilling or unable to
enunciate a workable and consistent standard to apply. This, in turn,
has lead to confusion in the courts and a series of ad hoc legislative
enactments that fail to resolve the central tension between
transparency and safety.
II. The Freedom of Information Act and the Differing
Treatment of Confidential Versus Nonconfidential
Inflammatory Material
The struggle between transparency and the need to suppress
inflammatory information has been debated since the adoption of the
Constitution.24 Indeed, much of First Amendment jurisprudence
arises from efforts by the government to either criminalize or prevent
the release of information that could cause harm to national security
or public peace.25 Consider the law of prior restraints. The Pentagon
Papers Case,2 6 to cite perhaps the most famous example, arose from
the Nixon Administration's efforts to prevent the publication of a
study that was highly critical of the government's handling of the
Vietnam conflict. The case Near v. Minnesota, to cite another
example, arose from efforts by the leadership of the city of
Minneapolis to prevent further publication of information that
(purportedly) undermined the "general welfare" as a result of its
inflammatory effect.27
The "fighting words," "imminent incitement" and the "true
threats" doctrines likewise find common root in preventing the
inflammatory effect that certain kinds of speech can have on the
23. See, e.g., Id.; Living Rivers Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 272 F. Supp. 2d
1313 (D. Utah 2003); Progressive, 467 F. Supp. 990. See generally Harris, supra note 10.
24. See generally Kristian W. Murray, National Security Veiled in Secrecy: An Analysis
of the State Secrets Privilege in National Security Agency Wiretapping Litigation, 199 MIL.
L. REV. 1 (2009).
25. For a wide-ranging discussion of the Government's ability to restrain speech
because of its potential harmful effects, see generally, GEOFFREY STONE, PERILOUS
TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME (2004).
26. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States ("The Pentagon Papers"), 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
27. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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listener, specifically, and society, in general. Hence, in Schenk v.
United States,28 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes created the "clear and
present danger" test in ruling that the government could prosecute
individuals whose speech had an inflammatory effect on listeners. In
Feiner v. New York,2 9 the Court similarly recognized and affirmed the
government's ability to arrest individuals engaged in speech that
would likely have resulted in riots if not censored. At the other
extreme are cases like Cohen v. California,0 in which the Court ruled
that speech cannot be censored merely because others find it
offensive.
In each of these cases, the Court was called upon to balance the
Constitution's strong commitment to the free flow of information
with the equally strong value of protecting against the very real harms
that can arise when the release of some kinds of inflammatory
information is not regulated. As stated by the Court in Chaplinisky v.
New Hampshire, certain utterances are not an "essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value ... that any
benefit that may derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality. ,31
Congress faced a similar conundrum in its debate over FOIA.
Originally enacted in 1966, FOIA arose from years of complaints by
the media, lawyers and the public that government agencies were
routinely denying access to critical public records for nefarious
reasons.32 The previous two laws that governed access to public
information, the Administrative Procedures Act of 1946 ("APA")
and the arcane Housekeeping Statute of 1789, gave government
agencies virtually unlimited discretion to withhold information for the
thinnest of reasons.33 Prior to the adoption of FOIA, administrative
agencies had the discretion to withhold any information "for good
cause," or if they determined that the public interest required
"secrecy." 34 The nature of the requestor was also relevant under the
28. Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
29. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
30. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); see also Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197,
1206 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
31. Chaplinisky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
32. For a detailed discussion of the FOIA's legislative history, see Martin E. Halstuk,
When Secrecy Trumps Transparency: Why the Open Government Act of 2007 Falls Short,
16 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 427 (2008).
33. Id. at 432-45.
34. Administrative Procedure Act § 3, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237, 238 (1946).
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APA, which only required disclosure to those individuals "properly
and directly concerned" with the requested information."
This broad discretion essentially turned the APA statute -
designed to foster government accountability-into a tool to justify
secrecy. As stated by the Supreme Court, the disclosure provisions of
the APA "came to be looked upon more as a withholding statute than
a disclosure statute," as administrative agencies used the "good
cause" standard as a justification to withhold whole categories of
nonconfidential material."6
As the defects in the APA became evident, Congress became
increasingly concerned that the general "secrecy" exemption was
being misused by agencies to "cover up embarrassing mistakes or
irregularities."37 As stated in one Congressional report, "[t]he [APA],
which was designed to provide public information about government
activities has become the Government's major shield of secrecy," and
was being used primarily to "avoid . . .political embarrassment."3 8
Despite the strong opposition of most government agencies,
FOIA successfully replaced the cult of secrecy with a presumption in
favor of full disclosure.39 To prevent the abuses engendered by the
general "public interest" standard of the APA, FOIA replaced it with
nine specific exemptions.40 In doing so, the statute successfully
eliminated much of the discretion which had previously been abused
by administrative agencies to avoid having to disclose potentially
embarrassing information.4' In light of FOIA's commitment to
transparency, courts have uniformly interpreted the exemptions
narrowly.42
The FOIA exemptions reflect an attempt by Congress to balance
the government's occasional need to operate in secrecy with a
democratic commitment to open and transparent government. The
need for secrecy in selected circumstances scarcely needs to be
debated. If the ultimate duty of government is to protect the
35. Id.
36. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973).
37. S. REP. No. 89-813, at 38 (1966); see also H.R. REP. No. 89-1497 (1966).
38. H.R. REP. No. 92-1419 (1966).
39. See, e.g., John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 152 (1989).
40. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2010).
41. See, e.g., Dep't of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976).
42. Id.
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populace from danger,43 logic and common sense dictate that certain
materials produced by the government must remain confidential.
Few would argue that shipping times during war," explicit directions
on how to build a weapon of mass destruction45 or the identity of
undercover CIA agents should be publicly disseminated." The first
FOIA exception, which exempts disclosure of documents that should
"be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy,"
reflects this value (the "National Security Exception").47
Other exceptions recognize a countervailing interest in
protecting an individual's personal privacy and constitutional rights.
Hence, Exception 4 allows for the withholding of personal financial
information while Exception 6 protects medical records from
"unwarranted invasion of privacy."" Exception 7(B) similarly
protects from disclosure information that would deprive individuals
of their constitutional right to a fair trial.49 Finally, other exceptions
recognize that secrecy is sometimes necessary to allow governments
to operate efficiently and effectively. For that reason, Exception 2
allows agencies to maintain the confidentially of "internal personnel
rules and practices," while Exception 5 protects materials prepared by
agencies in response to litigation."o Consider also Exceptions 7(A),
43. THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 20 (John Jay) (E. H. Scott, ed., 1898). ("Among the
many objects to which a wise and free people find it necessary to direct their attention,
that of providing for their safety seems to be the first.").
44. See, e.g., Near, 283 U.S. at 697.
45. Cf Progressive, 467 F. Supp. 990 (enjoining publication of an article describing in
detail how the United States built its first nuclear bomb).
46. Indeed, the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982, 50 U.S.C. §§ 421-426
(2010), criminalizes the disclosure of the identity of covert foreign agents.
47. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(1)(A) (2010) ("This section does not apply to matters that are
specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret
in the interest of national defense or foreign policy.").
48. Id. at § 552(b)(4), (6) (2010) ("This section does not apply to matters that are (4)
trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and
privileged or confidential[;] (6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure
of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."). See also
S. REP. No. 89-813, at 3 (1965) ("At the same time that a broad philosophy of 'freedom of
information' is enacted into law, it is necessary to protect certain equally important rights
of privacy .. . such as medical and personnel files.").
49. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(B) (2010).
50. Id. at § 552(b)(2), (5) (2010). See also S. REP. No 89-813, at 9 (1965) (Exception 5
recognized that the "[g]overnment would be greatly hampered if, with respect to legal and
policy matters, all Government agencies were prematurely forced to 'operate in a
fishbowl."').
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(D) and (E), which protect from disclosure materials related to law
enforcement proceedings and investigations."
Although the National Security and Law Enforcement
Exceptions differ in their focus, the underlying principal of protecting
information to prevent potential physical harm is the same. The need
to protect from disclosure confidential information that could
jeopardize national security seems self-evident. Protecting national
security secrets is vital because the information being protected, if
released, could result in tangible physical harm to Americans.
The focus of each of these exemptions is on protecting
information that has been designated as "secret" or "confidential."
In every case, Congress, in coordination with the President, has
determined that certain categories of information must remain
confidential irrespective of their value to public discourse because of
the risk that release of that information could directly or indirectly
lead to tangible harm to America. 3 Simply stated, military, law
enforcement and foreign affair "secrets" are categorically protected
for seemingly obvious reasons. But there has been no effort by
Congress or the courts to create a categorical exception for
nonconfidential but inflammatory material despite the fact that
general dissemination of this kind of material can cause the same kind
of harm as information designated as "confidential."
Instead, Congress and the courts have taken a piecemeal
approach to the issue of nonconfidential inflammatory material. To
cite one example, the Mutual Security Act of 1954 and its successor,
authorize the President to prohibit the export of any weapons-related
"technical data" that could potentially contribute to the development
of weapons of mass destruction.5 4 By regulation, the statute prohibits
51. 5 U.S.C. §H 552(b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(E) (2010).
52. RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT 106 (2006) (Civil liberties must be
balanced with the "need to conceal information that either might aid the enemy directly,
such as information about the design of weapons of mass destruction, or might weaken our
response to terrorism by publicizing the distasteful methods that may be an indispensible
element of that response.").
53. H.R. REP. No. 109-226, at 4 (2005) (As stated by the Committee on Government
Reform, "[w]hile ... FOIA ... support[s] the disclosure of agency records . . [it] . . . also
recognize[s] the legitimate need to restrict disclosure of some information. For example,
agencies may withhold information properly classified in the interest of national defense
or foreign policy and criminal investigatory files.").
54. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2278 (a)(2), (j)(4)(A) (2010).
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the export of such "technical data" irrespective of its secrecy." Most
recently, the Homeland Security Act created a new FOIA exemption
allowing the Executive Branch to withhold from production
nonclassified documents relating the nation's "critical
infrastructure."06
On rare occasion, courts have interpreted FOIA as protecting
nonconfidential inflammatory material. In American Friends Service
Committee v. Department of Defense," for example, the court was
presented with the question of whether "Technical Abstract
Bulletins" published by the Department of Defense, which contain
short summaries of research reports, should be protected from
disclosure. Many of the underlying reports are released to the public
and the abstracts themselves do not contain confidential information.
The Court ruled that withholding the abstracts from public view was
justified because, although any individual abstract may not harm
national security, a "compilation" of those abstracts could be used to
"draw useful inferences about the direction of U.S. research into
weapons or defensive technologies.",8
Likewise, the fact that a general description of a confidential
matter has reached the public domain. does not waive the
government's right to prevent official disclosure of the information
under the National Security Exception.59 In rare cases, the
government has even successfully reclassified information that had
been previously declassified.'
With these very few exceptions, most categories of
nonconfidential inflammatory information falls into a legal no man's
land, in the sense that neither Congress nor the courts have
55. See, e.g., United States v. Edler Indus., Inc., 579 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1978) (stating
that technical information exported by the defendant was widely distributed in the United
States did not preclude prosecution).
56. Critical Infrastructures Information Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296 §
214(a)(1)(A), 116 Stat. 2135, 2152 (2002).
57. Am. Friends Serv. Comm. v. Dep't of Def., 831 F.2d 441 (3d Cir. 1987).
58. Id. at 444; cf Pub. Educ. Ctr., Inc. v. Dep't of Def., 905 F. Supp. 19, 22 (D.D.C.
1995) (affirming decision to withhold videotapes of a failed raid by U.S. Army Rangers
during the Somalia conflict despite the fact that the details of the raid were "well-
known").
59. Morley v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 508 F.3d 1108, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (finding
prior disclosure of a "secret" does not require the government to disclose "specific
information" related to the formerly confidential matter).
60. Amanda Fitzsimmons, National Security or Unnecessary Secrecy? Restricting
Exemption 1 to Prohibit Reclassification of Information Already in the Public Domain, 4
I/S J. LAW & POL'Y 479 (2008).
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developed a consistent legal structure to evaluate Executive claims
that such information should remain outside of the public sphere
because of the potential mischief its release could cause. The
distinction between "classified" information, which is presumptively
protected, and "unclassified" information, which is not, makes little
sense when considered in light of the reason(s) why classified
information is protected from disclosure. At bottom, the government
protects classified information because of the physical harm that can
result from its release. But certain kinds of information not formally
designated as "confidential" raise these exact kind of concerns. The
mere fact that the government has designated the materials as
"confidential" is not a sufficient justification for the differential
treatment. To treat the designation over the actual nature of the
potential harm as dispositive is to exalt form over substance.
Allowing the dissemination of information on how to build a bomb
creates the exact same harm irrespective of whether that information
has been designated "confidential."
The same is true of the Abu Ghraib photographs. The harm
their release could have caused is the same irrespective of whether
they are labeled "confidential" or "nonconfidential." As such, the
Abu Ghraib photographs illustrate the illogic of treating
inflammatory information differently based merely on its security
classification. The way in which the case was decided by the Second
Circuit also illustrates the need for a more comprehensive and logical
structure for handling claims by the Executive that certain
information needs to be withheld from the public sphere irrespective
of its secrecy.
III. ACLU v. DOD: A Case Study of the Dangers of Releasing
Inflammatory Material
The saga behind ACLU v. DOD began in December 2002, when
the Washington Post published a story disclosing that terrorism
suspects were being tortured by the CIA.61 Ten months later, the
American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") and several other
organizations filed a FOIA request with (among others) the
Department of Defense, the Department of Justice and the CIA
requesting a long list of records related to treatment of the
61. Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations,
WASH. POST, Dec. 26,2002, at Al.
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detainees." With a few exceptions, the Defendants refused to
produce any documents responsive to the request."
In May of 2004, The New Yorker published an article describing
widespread "sadistic, blatant and wanton criminal abuse" of prisoners
detained at Abu Ghraib prison." The article was based largely on a
secret fifty-three page investigative report prepared by the Army
which had been leaked to the magazine. Almost simultaneously, the
CBS television show "60 Minutes 2" aired an expos6 on the scandal,
in which it showed a number of photographs of guards abusing
prisoners.
The pictures broadcast by CBS were clearly inflammatory.
Among other things, prisoners were forced into humiliating and
dehumanizing poses and then photographed. One prisoner, for
example, was posed, nude, to appear as if he were performing oral sex
on another man. Another posed photograph shows a nude man with
a sandbag over his head apparently masturbating."
The New Yorker and 60 Minutes expos6s unleashed a flood of
articles and commentaries detailing the torture of detainees in the
custody of the United States, including several who apparently were
tortured to death. The reaction of the militant Islamic world was
particularly savage. As stated by a contemporaneous report
published in the Bahrain Tribune, the stories resulted in websites
being "flooded" with calls "for revenge" against U.S. interests.6
Protests sprang up throughout the Islamic world in response to the
62. Document request from ACLU to Department of Defense submitted under
FOIA, Amer. Civil Liberties Union v. Dep't of Def., 339 F. Supp. 2d 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(No. 04-cv-04151-AKH).
63. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Dep't of Def., 339 F. Supp. 2d at 502.
64. Seymour Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, THE NEW YORKER, May 10, 2004.
65. Rebecca Leung, Abuse of Iraqi POW's by GI's Probed, CBS NEWS, Apr. 28, 2004,
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/04/27/6011/main614063.shtml.
66. Id.; see also Daniel Schom, Exposing the Truth of Abu Ghraib, 60 Minutes, Dec.
10, 2007, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/04/27/6011/main614063.shtml
(the photographs came primarily from the camera of prison guard Charles Graner, a
photography buff, who took them as souvenirs. He shared them accidently with a co-
worker, Joe Darby, who was looking for scenic pictures to send home. Darby was
rightfully appalled. He secretly made a copy of the photographs and gave them
anonymously to the Army's Criminal Investigations Division).
67. See, e.g., Editorial, The Sickpuppy Defense, NEW YORK PRESS, May 18, 2004,
available at http://www.nypress.com/article-9397-the-sickpuppy-defense.html; Editorial,
Rules of the System, WASH. POST, May 11, 2004, at A18.
68. Iraqis' Protest Against Jail Abuse, BAHRAIN TRIBUNE, June 5, 2004.
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disclosures. 9  Claims that the pictures "give [terrorists] the best
motives to mobilize (sic) frustrated youths who care for their religion
and dignity"'o and calls to "pierce the eyes of [Americans]" and
"castrate them on the banks of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers" were
typical." Several weeks after the publication of the photographs, a
militant group associated with Al Qaeda, Muntada al-Ansarm,
released a video showing the beheading of Nicholas Berg, a
telecommunications businessman who had been kidnapped by
terrorists in early April of 2004. The group claimed in the video that
the beheading was in retaliation for prisoner abuses at Abu Ghraib."
In response to these disclosures, on May 25, 2004, the ACLU
renewed its FOIA request." Again, the government did not timely
respond to the request, which lead to the filing of the lawsuit in early
July of 2004.74 Following wrangling between the parties as to the
timing of disclosures, the court gave the government until October 15,
2004 to produce either the requested documents or a "Vaughn index"
justifying nondisclosure."
Ultimately the government refused to produce five categories of
documents," including 144 photographs and four videotapes taken by
a military policeman at Abu Ghraib prison showing prisoner abuse."
The government justified withholding the documents under FOIA
Exceptions 6 and 7(C), which deal with medical or other files the
disclosure of which would constitute an "unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy. "7 As an afterthought, the government also cited
69. Id.
70. Editorial, AL- QUDS AL-ARABI, June 4, 2004.
71. Iraqis'Protest, supra note 68, quoting www.alsaha.net.
72. Bill Nichols, Video Shows Beheading of American Captive, USA TODAY, May 11,
2004, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2004-05-11-iraq-
beheading.x.htm.
73. FOIA Compl. at T 45, Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Dep't of Def., 389 F. Supp. 2d
547 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 04-cv-04151-AKH).
74. Id.
75. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Dep't of Def , 339 F. Supp. 2d at 505.
76. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Dep't of Def, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 551 (the five
categories were: reports relating to the International Committee of the Red Cross,
documents relating to interrogation activities, the "CIA's refusal to confirm or deny the
existence or possession of certain documents," the CIA's assertion that a request by its
Director to Donald Rumsfeld "that a certain Iraqi suspect be held at a high-level
detention center and not be identified" contained no segregable portions and the Abu
Ghraib photographs).
77. Id. at 568.
78. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (2010).
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Exemption 7(F), which gives the government the authority to
withhold any information, compiled for law enforcement activities,
which "could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical
safety of any individual" 9 (the "Law Enforcement Exception" or
"Exception 7(F)."a To overcome the privacy claims the court
ordered an in-camera review of both redacted and unredacted
versions of the photographs. The court ultimately applied a balancing
test in evaluating the privacy claim and concluded that the interest in
"honest and open government" outweighed the minimal privacy
concerns raised by the redacted photographs."
The 7(F) claim presented both a legal issue and a larger
philosophic issue. At the surface level, the court had to determine
whether the "any person" language of 7(F) should be interpreted to
encompass only readily identifiable individuals directly involved in the
criminal justice process who could be harmed by a particular
disclosure.82 The government urged a broader definition of the "any
person" language, arguing that it should be interpreted literally to
include all individuals, including United States citizens, who could be
subject to a retaliatory terrorist attack."
The government's argument for a broad definition of Exception
7(F) was supported by two cases, Living Rivers Inc. v U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation" and Larouche v. Webster.8 ' The defendant agency in
Living Rivers had prepared an "inundation map" of the area below
the Hoover and Glenn Canyon dams for the purpose of evaluating
the potential effects of a dam failure. The government sought to
withhold disclosure of the maps on the grounds that it would give
79. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F) (2010).
80. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Dep't of Def., 389 F. Supp. 2d at 574 (noting that the
government waited more than two months after the motion for summary judgment was
argued to raise the 7(F) defense).
81. Id. at 551 (The government also withheld reports relating to the International
Committee of the Red Cross and certain documents relating to the DOD's interrogation
techniques. The ACLU challenged the CIA's refusal to confirm or deny the existence of
certain documents relating to the CIA's legal authorization to carry out torture and the
existence of a purported request by CIA Director Tenet that an Iraqi suspect being held at
a high-level DOD detention center not be listed on the prison roles).
82. ACLU v. DOD, 543 F.3d at 74 (This point was made clear in the Second Circuit's
opinion, where the court interpreted Section 7(F) as only applying to "specific threats to
particular individuals.").
83. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Dep't of Def., 389 F. Supp. 2d at 576-79.
84. Living Rivers, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 1313.
85. Larouche v. Webster, No. 75 Civ. 6010, 1984 WL 1061 (S.D.N.Y. October 23,
1984).
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terrorists a roadmap of the specific population areas, power plants
and other "critical" infrastructure that could be destroyed by a
successful attack on the dams. The government contended that
providing this information would disclose to putative terrorists the
advantages and disadvantages to attacking individual features of the
two dams and would otherwise increase the risk of an attack.8 The
resolution of the case turned on the question whether the "any
person" language of the exception truly meant "any person" or was
limited to potential harm to law enforcement personnel. Adopting a
plain language approach, the court concluded that the government
had met its burden of establishing that disclosure could reasonably be
expected to harm "any person[,]" namely the individuals who lived
down river from the dams."
In Larouche, the government sought to withhold an FBI
laboratory report that described home-built machine guns. Citing
Exemption 7(F), the FBI argued that although it could not identify
with any specificity any particular law enforcement personnel who
could be harmed by the disclosure, the danger to law enforcement
personnel in general would be elevated by knowledge of how to build
machine guns being widely disseminated. The district court agreed,
upholding the decision to suppress the documents on the grounds that
it was necessary to protect law enforcement personnel as a class from
potential encounters with criminals armed with home-built machine
88guns.
Read jointly, these two cases stand for the proposition that the
Law Enforcement Exception protects all individuals from the harm
that can be occasioned from the disclosure of inflammatory,
dangerous material irrespective of the government's inability to
identify with reasonable specificity a particular individual who would
be placed in danger. The district court in ACLU never specifically
ruled on the applicability of these cases, but suggested that Larouche
and Living Rivers applied only when there was a direct nexus
between law enforcement and the documents being sought."89 Given
that the requested photographs were not taken in the course of any
criminal investigation, the court reasoned, no such nexus existed.'
86. Living Rivers, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 1321.
87. Id.
88. Larouche, 1984 WL at *1061.
89. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Dep't of Def, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 577.
90. Id. at 577-78.
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The district court ultimately ruled that the answer whether the
photographs should be released did not turn on the specific language
of the Exemption, but rather on if the value of transparency and open
government embodied by FOIA outweighed the danger posed to
American troops and civilians. In doing so, the court specifically
rejected an argument by the government that threats to life or safety
are best evaluated by the Executive and, accordingly, that the 'court's
role should be limited to ensuring that the decision to withhold was
properly motivated by that concern.
Although not discussed in any detail by the court, the
government submitted an affidavit by then-Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, in support of its argument
that disclosure of the photographs would threaten the lives of
American troops and citizens. General Meyer, a 40-year veteran,
made a compelling argument that release of the photographs "would
pose a clear and grave risk of inciting violence and riots against
American troops and coalition forces" as well as "innocent Iraqi,
Afghani and American civilians."" He further stated, consistent with
commonsense, that "Al Qaeda and other groups will seize these
images ... as grist for their propaganda mill, which will result in ...
violent attacks, increased terrorist recruitment . .. and exacerbation
of tensions.",3 In support of his conclusions, General Myer cited the
reaction American enemies had to a fallacious report published in
Newsweek magazine that American soldiers had desecrated the
Koran at Guantanamo Bay.
In Afghanistan, in particular, where over 19,000 U.S. troops are
currently serving in Operation Enduring Freedom, violence erupted
as a result of the Newsweek report. Demonstrations began in the
eastern provinces and spread to the capital, Kabul. The United
Nations, as a precautionary measure, withdrew its entire foreign
staff from Jalalabad, where two of its guesthouses were attacked,
government buildings and shops were targeted, and offices of two
of two international aid groups were destroyed. At least 17 deaths
in Afghanistan were attributed to the reaction to the Koran story.94
91. Id. at 578.
92. Decl. of Richard B. Myers at 25, Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Dep't of Def., 339
F. Supp. 2d 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (No. 04-cv-04151-AKH).
93. Id. at Conclusion.
94. Second Am. Decl. of Richard B. Myers at 17 Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Dep't
of Def., 339 F. Supp. 2d 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (No. 04-cv-04151-AKH).
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In a conclusion that would later come back to haunt the
government, General Meyers also predicted that disclosure would
increase the "likelihood of violence against US interests, personnel
and citizens world-wide.""
In performing its de novo balancing, the district court essentially
disposed of the forty-eight pages of analysis provided by General
Myers in four sentences, concluding "[w]ith great respect to the
concerns expressed by General Myers, my task is not to defer to our
worst fears, but to interpret and apply this law, in this case, the
Freedom of Information Act, which advances values important to our
society, transparency and accountability in government."96
Having rejected General Myers' concerns, the court ordered
disclosure, concluding that the "education and publicity" engendered
by release of the photographs "will strengthen our purpose and, by
enabling such deficiencies ... to be ... corrected, show our strength
as a vibrant and functioning democracy to be emulated." 97 In essence,
the court chose to order the release of the photographs despite the
uncontradicted conclusion of General Myers that doing so would
result in the death of some unidentifiable Americans or their allies.
The district court's ultimate conclusion requires a slight detour to
examine the question whether publication of these photographs truly
added in any meaningful way to the underlying debate. Again, the
fact that the United States had mistreated detainees was well known.
The details of that abuse, including waterboarding and infliction of
physical pain, had been widely disseminated and debated. 8 In light of
the nonconfidential nature of the information portrayed in the
photographs, the court's conclusion was ultimately rooted in the old
adage "a picture is worth a thousand words."" Given the very vocal
public debate about torture, the argument can be made that these
pictures did not add to the so-called "marketplace of ideas" in any
95. Id. at Conclusion.
96. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Dep't of Def , 389 F. Supp. 2d at 576.
97. Id. at 578.
98. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 66.
99. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Dep't of Def, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 578 ("[T]he
pictures are the best evidence of what happened, better than words, which might fail to
describe, or summaries, which might err in their attempt to generalize and abbreviate.").
The origin of the "picture is worth a thousand words" adage is in dispute. It has attributed
to Frederick R Barnard, a 1920s-era advertising executive. Barnard, in turn, claimed the
phrase arose from a Chinese Proverb. THE PHRASE FINDER, available at
http://www.phrases.org.uk.
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scholarly or cognitive sense. Rather, the pictures were valuable
because of their emotive content.
Reliance on the emotive impact of the pictures to justify their
release, however, misses the point of the underlying debate.
Certainly, speech designed solely to play on the emotions of the
listener has constitutional value."'o Here, however, both sides
rightfully could claim "emotive impact" as the basis for their entire
claim. The government sought to prevent disclosure precisely
because the pictures would cause (according to the government) a
violent emotional reaction. The proponents of release make
essentially the same argument, seeking disclosure because of the
emotive reaction of disgust and anger that will result from
publication. The question is not whether the pictures have value
because of the emotions they engender, but rather whether violent
acts that can be prevented are among the emotive responses that
would result if they had been released.
IV. The Appeal
The administration appealed, but the appeal was withdrawn in
March of 2006 a month after a website published 279 photographs
and nineteen videos that had been leaked to it."o' Not surprisingly,
their publication revived the controversy over Abu Ghraib and
resulted in a new series of condemnations by the Muslim World.'
The debate was reengaged three months later when the district
court ordered the release of twenty-nine additional photographs.as
Despite the fact that hundreds of photographs had already been
published, the government reinstituted the appeal to prevent these
final photographs from becoming public."
100. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. at 26 ("We cannot sanction the view that
the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech, has little or
no regard for that emotive function which, practically speaking, may often be the more
important element of the overall message sought to be communicated.").
101. The Abu Ghraib Files, SALON (Mar. 14, 2006) available at http://Salon.com/
news/abu.ghraib/2006/03/14/introduction/index.html; U.S. Agrees to Release Abu Ghraib
Photos, SALON, available at http://Salon.com/news/abu-ghraib/2006/03/29aclu-abu.ghraib/
index.html.
102. See e.g., Latest Abu Ghraib Pictures Threaten to Inflame Anger in Iraq, USA
TODAY, (February 16, 2006): Tom Regan, New Abu Ghraib Abuse Photos Anger Arabs,
REUTERS (Feb 15, 2006).
103. Amer. Civil Liberties Union v. Dep't of Def , 2006 WL 1722574 (S.D.N.Y. June 21,
2006).
104. ACLU v. DOD, 543 F.3d at 65.
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To its credit, the Second Circuit largely ignored the district
court's paean to transparency and instead undertook a detailed
analysis of legislative intent. In doing so, however, the circuit court
likewise made short work of the administration's concerns, assuming
for purposes of its opinion, but not deciding, that release of the
photographs "could reasonably be expected to incite violence against
the United States."105
From this starting point, the Second Circuit chose to essentially
rewrite Exception 7(F) to require the government to identify with
"reasonable specificity" the individual or group of individuals who
would be put at risk. In doing so, the court rejected the government's
argument that the phrase "any individual" meant exactly what it said.
Rather, the court concluded that the term "any" was sufficiently
ambiguous in the context of FOIA to require it to engage in the
"holistic endeavor" of determining whether the statute protected
amorphous groups or instead required the government to specifically
identify the individual or individuals that would be harmed by the
disclosure.'as
Reading the term "any" literally, the court of appeals concluded,
would essentially render the word "individual" superfluous by
protecting from disclosure any information that might theoretically
"endanger life or physical safety" of amorphous and unidentified
groups. That logic justified, in the court's mind, redefining the word
"any" to mean only "specified individuals." Ultimately, the court
read into the statute a requirement that an agency seeking to prevent
disclosure must "identify at least one individual with reasonable
specificity" who would potentially be endangered by the disclosure."
The government failed to meet that burden because General Myers'
affidavit had identified the individuals at risk broadly to encompass
American soldiers and the civilian population of Afghanistan and
Iraq.10
The Second Circuit's opinion leads to the rather anomalous
result that potentially dangerous information that could harm a single
readily identifiable individual is protected but information that could
lead to grievous harm to many individuals must be disclosed. Under
105. Id. at 67, n.3.
106. Id. at 72.
107. Id. at 71.
108. In rejecting the "plain language" rule of statutory interpretation, the Second
Circuit explicitly disavowed the view taken by the district court in Living Rivers, 272 F.
Supp. 2d 1313; a case heavily relied upon by the government.
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this interpretation, the individual street informant or "stool pigeon" is
protected but the mass of American soldiers are not.'"
The government did not and could not rely on the National
Security Exception to FOIA. As discussed previously, this exception
protects from disclosure records that are "properly" designated
pursuant to an Executive Order as containing information that should
be "kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy."no
First, there was nothing particularly secret about the photographs or
the "information" that they contained. Second, the photographs had
not been designated as confidential by the government."'
Lost in the Second Circuit's analysis is the underlying reason for
exception 7(F). Congress determined that no individual should be
harmed by the release of law enforcement material, irrespective of
their relationship to the information being released. The court did
not challenge the government's argument that releasing these
photographs would result in harm to someone. That "someone" here,
likely was American troops. But because the government could not
name which individual would be harmed, it lost the case.
The case took a turn after the court of appeals issued its opinion.
Initially, the government decided to not seek Supreme Court
review."2 Less than three weeks later, the Department of Justice,
after "further reflection" at the "highest level of government,"
reversed course and filed for writ of certiorari."' According to David
Axelrod, a presidential advisor, President Obama changed his
position because of fear that release of the photographs could
jeopardize American troops:
109. The court's conclusion brings to mind Richard Matheson's famous story, "Button
Button." In this story, a stranger offers a financially struggling family a black box
containing a button. The stranger tells the family that if they push the button they will
receive $50,000 but someone, somewhere in the world who they do not know will die. The
husband opposes the idea, but the wife pushes the button anyway. That night, the
husband is killed in a train accident and the wife collects his $50,000 insurance policy. The
story, a play on an alienation theme, concludes with the stranger telling the wife that she
never really knew her husband. To draw the analogy, the Second Circuit was willing to
"push the button" and allow potential harm to come to American soldiers because the
government could not identify with "reasonable" specificity those person(s) who would be
harmed.
110. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2010).
111. ACLU v. DOD, 543 F.3d at 74.
112. Letter from Department of Justice to Hon. Alvin K Hellerstein (April 23, 2009)
(on file with author).
113. Letter from Department of Justice to Hon. Alvin K Hellerstein (May 13, 2009)
(on file with author).
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"Well, obviously the photos are provocative....
They've had an inflammatory effect. They were used
by our opponents and Al-Qaida as propaganda tools
and recruiting devices. [[]And so we don't want to go
back there again .... My fundamental understanding
from the President is that he feels strongly that this
would have a deleterious effect on our troops, that it
would put them in jeopardy, and he wants to pursue all
legal avenues to prevent their release."H4
Shortly before the petition for certiorari was set to be decided,
Congress enacted the "Protected National Security Document Act of
2009," which, by its plain language, gives the President the explicit
authority to withhold the Abu Ghraib photographs."' Specifically,
this Act gives the Secretary of Defense the authority to withhold from
production any photograph taken between September 11, 2001,
through January 22, 2009, that depicts "the treatment of individuals
... detained ... by the Armed Forces of the United States."H6
Exercising this authority, the Obama Administration has chosen to
not release the photographs."7
V. Presidential Powers and FOIA
The two opinions issued in ACLU v. DOD provide a framework
to analyze the conflicting interests implicated by government efforts
to suppress the disclosure of information because of its potentially
inflammatory effects. The case also highlights the dilemma faced by
the Executive when confronted with a demand to release
nonconfidential information the President and his agents legitimately
believe will cause substantive, physical harm to Americans. As
interpreted by the Second Circuit, FOIA does not provide the
Executive with a basis to withhold production; nor (with some very
narrow exceptions)"' does any other statute provide such discretion.
114. Jim Leherer, Interview with David Axelrod, PBS NEWSHOUR, (May 14, 2009)
available at http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/astral66/2009/05/
do-we-really-need-to-see-photo.php.
115. Section 565(c)(1), Pub L. 111-83 (2009).
116. Id.
117. Dep't of Defense v Amer. Civil Liberties Union, 130 S. Ct 777 (2009), granting cert.
and vacating judgment in ACLU v DOD, 543 F.3d 59.
118. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(E) (2010).
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Facing such a request, the President has three choices. He can
release the information, and then face the inevitable political fall-out
when or if the substantive harm comes about. He can, like President
Obama, hope that Congress steps in and enacts a limited "one-time
only" exception to FOIA."' Or, he can hope that the reviewing court
rejects the constricted view of the President's inherent power to
protect American lives adopted by the Second Circuit.
Assuming that the President's concerns over potential harm are
legitimate, simply releasing the information would be an abdication of
the President's responsibility as the Chief Executive and Commander
in Chief.120 The current "ad hoc" approach guarantees inconsistency
and, more importantly, overstates the role of the Legislative Branch
in our constitutional structure. As a deliberative body, Congress has
neither the time nor the expertise to sort out every claim that release
of inflammatory material will cause substantive harm. As noted by
any number of Presidents and commentators, our constitutional
structure vests the President with ample, if not exclusive, authority
over foreign affairs and, to a lesser extent, war.121 Decisions as to
whether releasing dangerous material will cause substantive harm
require swift action, which cannot be provided by a purposefully
decentralized Congress.2 2 Here, by way of example, it took Congress
nearly five years after the district court's opinion to weigh in.12
Meanwhile, the President again remains in the difficult position of not
knowing whether he has discretion to prevent the dissemination of
the inflammatory material or whether he needs to begin planning a
response to the hostile effects such release would cause.
119. The need for a general statute giving the President enhanced authority to
withhold inflammatory information from disclosure is discussed ably by Stewart Harris in
his article, The First Amendment and the End of the World, 68 U. PITr. L. REV. 785, 816
(2007). Although Professor Harris' solution remains viable, as will be argued below, a
new statute is not necessary because court's already have a constitutional and statutory
duty to defer to the President's determination that certain inflammatory materials should
be withheld from disclosure irrespective of Congress' determination. See infra notes 126-
87 and text accompanying.
120. See id. See also Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (discussing the President's
authority and obligation to protect the security of the nation).
121. For a detailed discussion of the need to vest the President with ability to act
quickly over foreign affair and war issues, see generally JOHN YOO, CRISIS AND
COMMAND (2009).
122. See, e.g. id. at 402.
123. The Southern District of New York issued its first opinion on the matter in
September of 2004. The "Protected National Security Documents Act of 2009" was
adopted in the fall of 2009. H.R. REP. No. 111-298 (2009).
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Given the current untenable situation, the ultimate solution to
this dilemma lies in a better appreciation of the separation of powers
between the President and Congress, as well as the Judiciary's limited
role in refereeing these kinds of disputes. Before FOIA, the answer
was simple. All three branches historically recognized that decisions
regarding the release of inflammatory material bearing on foreign
affairs and war issues lay firmly with the President.124 Indeed, George
Washington was the first-but by no means the last-President to
assert the right to withhold sensitive information, even from
Congress, related to foreign affairs. Following the ratification of the
controversial "Jay Treaty" with Britain, Republicans in the House,
seeking to embarrass the Washington Administration, voted
overwhelmingly to require the President to produce all papers related
to the Treaty.125 Washington refused to disclose the information,
asserting that its release would both harm national interests and that
the House had no constitutional authority to require the President to
release "sensitive" information related to the exercise of his foreign
affair powers.126
A substantial number of Presidents since Washington have
likewise asserted a constitutionally based right to withhold from
disclosure inflammatory documents, including Jefferson,27 Jackson,2 8
Truman,'129 and, of course, Nixon.30 One of the strongest assertions of
an executive privilege to withhold information-even nonconfidential
information-from public disclosure was asserted by President
Eisenhower. In 1954, Eisenhower issued a "public letter" in which he
prohibited Department of Defense employees from testifying or
124. See, infra notes 126-84 and text accompanying,
125. For a further discussion of the Jay Treaty and its aftermath, see YOO, supra note
121, at 92-95.
126. GLENN A. PHELPS, GEORGE WASHINGTON AND AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM, 174-75 (1993).
127. See infra notes 136-37.
128. In 1833, Jackson refused a demand by the Senate that he produce a document
created by his Attorney General, future Supreme Court Justice Roger Taney, that was
highly critical of the Federal Bank. The general contents of that letter had already been
leaked to the press, placing it in the category of an inflammatory, nonconfidential,
communication. Andrew Jackson, Message to the Senate (December 12, 1833) in 3
RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 36 (James Richardson ed.,
1896).
129. President Truman refused a demand by the House Un-American Activities
Committee to release to Congress files on employees accused of being disloyal. YOO,
supra note 121 at 382.
130. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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providing information to Senator McCarthy and his infamous House
Un-American Activities Committee. Asserting a privilege broader
than simply protecting confidential information, Eisenhower asserted
a constitutional privilege to withhold any information, secret or
otherwise, if its release "would be incompatible with the public
interest or jeopardize the safety of the Nation."13 ' This executive
privilege has been interpreted by other Presidents to expand beyond
material that would cause immediate injury to encompass both
material related to law enforcement investigations3 2 and Presidential
deliberations.
The most recent guidance on the scope of the President's
independent, constitutional authority to protect inflammatory
material from release comes, ironically, from former President
Nixon's efforts to suppress the Watergate Tapes' release. The United
States Supreme Court, in United States v. Nixon, likewise recognized
that the separation of powers doctrine mandated recognition of a
qualified privilege to protect presidential communications and, in
particular, those that implicate military, diplomatic or national
security interests.134
Likewise, since the founding, federal courts have generally
recognized the President's inherent authority to withhold information
from public disclosure where its release could harm national security,
irrespective of its "secrecy."13 ' As early as 1801, Justice John Marshall
in the case United States v Burr recognized a qualified "state secrets"
privilege. 136 During his prosecution for treason, former Vice President
Aaron Burr sought a subpoena from Justice Marshall ordering
131. YOo, supra note 121 at 382-83.
132. See, e.g., Response to Congressional Requests for Information Regarding Decisions
Made Under the Independent Counsel Act, 10 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 68, 75-78 (1986)
(asserting an executive privilege to withhold even "closed" law enforcement files from
Congress); Assertion of Executive Privilege in Response to Congressional Demands for
Law Enforcement Files, 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 31, 32-33 (1982) (same).
133. See, e.g., Executive Privilege With Respect to Clemency Decision, 23 Op. Off. Legal
Counsel 1, 1-2 (1999); Assertion of Executive Privilege in Response to a Congressional
Subpoena, 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 27, 30 (1981).
134. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 711.
135. See, e.g., Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1982). For a general discussion
of the constitutionally based state secrets privilege, see Thomas G. Stacy, The Constitution
in Conflict: Espionage Prosecutions, the Right to Present a Defense, and the State Secrets
Privilege, 58 U. COLO. L. REv. 177, 205-15 (1987). Cf FEDERALIST No. 64 ("It seldom
happens in the negotiation of treaties .. . but that perfect secrecy and immediate dispatch
are sometimes requisite.").
136. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (U.S. Court of Appeals 1801).
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Thomas Jefferson to release a letter Jefferson had received from one
of his generals that discussed Burr's allegedly treasonous activities.
Jefferson opposed the subpoena, asserting that the document could
contain confidential, state secrets. The existence of the letter and its
general content had been described by Jefferson in an address to
Congress, and, therefore, was not strictly confidential.137  Justice
Marshall, acting in his capacity as a Circuit Court Judge, issued the
subpoena, largely on the grounds that no evidence had been
presented to suggest that it contained any information that would
"endanger public safety." Had such a showing been made, Marshall
concluded, the letter would be "suppressed." 13 8 Justice Marshall in
the Burr case recognized (without analysis) the President's inherent
authority to protect inflammatory information; the release of which
would harm national interests.
The State Secrets Privilege is an evidentiary privilege that
protects secret information from discovery or disclosure in a litigation
context.13 9 Unlike FOIA, which balances First Amendment values
with the need to protect confidentiality, the State Secrets Privilege
strikes a balance between the interests of litigants in vindicating
individual rights with the need to safeguard national security
interests.'40 Despite its different focus, the State Secrets Privilege is
relevant to the current debate for two reasons. First, the privilege is a
form of constitutional common law in which the Court again
recognized that the President must be granted almost complete
deference in deciding the kinds of inflammatory material touching
upon national security that should remain confidential. Second, the
fact that the Court recognized such a privilege despite the absence of
any enabling legislation would suggest that the Court has historically
recognized a presidential prerogative to protect inflammatory
material irrespective of the legislative landscape.
The existence of the State Secret Privilege suggests that the
Court has a role outside of FOIA to consider whether the President
has independent constitutional authority to withhold inflammatory,
nonconfidential information from broad release. Further support
comes from the law of prior restraints. The question of whether
government can restrain the publication of "confidential" information
137. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 44 (1973).
138. Id. at 37.
139. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 (1953).
140. Halkin, 690 F.2d at 990.
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already in the possession of news media raises many of the same
issues as efforts by the government to ensure that nonconfidential but
inflammatory materials never reaches the media in the first place. In
both cases, the issue is, or should be, the same: whether the
dissemination of the information should be restrained because of its
potentially adverse secondary effects.
Although prior restraints bear a "heavy presumption"
"against . . . constitutional validity"14' the Supreme Court has long
recognized that situations could arise where publication of offending
material would create such a danger that the First Amendment must
step aside. This is particularly true in matters that touch upon
national security. Hence, in Near v. Minnesota, the Court suggested
that notwithstanding the strong presumption against prior restraints,
the "publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and
location of troops" could be restrained without violating the First
Amendment.'42
The Supreme Court has never enunciated an exact standard for
when the potential danger permits for imposition of a prior restraint.
Guidance, however, can be divined from the various opinions issued
in the previously mentioned Pentagon Papers Case." This case arose
from the President's efforts to restrain the publication of a Pentagon
study that was highly critical of the government's handling of the
Vietnam conflict. A copy of the study was leaked by Daniel Ellsberg,
a defense contractor, to the New York Times and Washington Post.'"
After the district court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the
papers from publishing the material, an emergency appeal was taken
to the Supreme Court.
The Court, then, struck down the injunction, in a fractured
decision that generated six separate written opinions. In three
separate opinions, Justices Hugo Black,'14' Byron White 46 and William
0. Douglas47 rejected the argument that the President has
141. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
142. Near, 283 U.S. at 715. This quote is particularly relevant because the departure
times of commercial ships, even in wartime, are not, strictly speaking, a government secret.
143. The Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 714.
144. Id. See also Glenn Greenwald, An Interview with Daniel Ellsberg, SALON RADIO,
available at http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn-greenwald/radio/2008/07/25/ ellsberg/
index.html (last visited September 7, 2010).
145. The Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 714.
146. Id. at 730.
147. Id. at 727.
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independent authority to prevent the release of potential
inflammatory material. As stated by Justice White, "in the absence of
legislation by Congress, I am unable to agree that the inherent powers
of the Executive ... have [] such sweeping potential ... to inhibit []
the publications by the press."'
A majority of the Justices, however, believed that the Court,
given more time, should develop a constitutional standard for
analyzing claims by the Executive of a constitutional privilege to
prevent the publication of inflammatory material related to national
security. Justices William Brennan and Harry Blackmun suggested a
test that borrowed heavily from the "clear and present danger" test
suggested by Justice Holmes in the Schenk case. As phrased by
Justice Brennan:
[O]nly government allegation and proof that publication must
inevitably, directly and immediately cause the occurrence of an
event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at
sea can support even the issuance of an interim restraining
order.149
Justice Blackmun (who dissented) essentially agreed, invoking
Schenk by name and suggesting that the appropriate test is "a
question of proximity and degree."'
Justice John Marshall Harlan and Chief Justice Warren Burger
also dissented, suggesting that the combination of deference to the
Executive and the Judiciary's constrained role in areas of foreign
affair should limit the scope of review to determining whether the
withheld information fell within the President's foreign affairs power
and whether the decision to withhold was made by the appropriate
agency head after due consideration of the issues."' In a sense,
Harlan's dissent reflected the FOIA standard prior to the 1974
amendments, which limited the 'Court's role in evaluating claims of
national security under FOIA to ensuring that a secrecy label was
attached pursuant to the procedures set forth in a valid executive
order. The two wild cards in the opinion were Justices Stewart and
148. Id. at 732.
149. Id. at 726-27; see also Progressive., 467 F. Supp. at 990 (particularly relevant
because the article enjoined was a synthesis of information that was in the public domain,
a fact stipulated by the government); supra note 137.
150. The Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 761.
151. Id. at 757.
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White. Justice Stewart suggested in his concurring opinion, joined by
Justice White, that the President retains inherent authority to restrain
the publication of inflammatory information if the publication would
result in "direct, immediate and irreparable damage.".. In a separate
opinion joined by Justice Stewart, however, Justice White argued that
no such power existed absent congressional approval.
Despite this confusion, two strands relevant to the current debate
can be derived from The Pentagon Papers. First, and most
importantly, a majority of the Court either explicitly or implicitly
recognized that the President has some, limited, inherent authority
even without congressional approval to prevent the public disclosure
of information that could be harmful to American security interests.
Second, in a theme that will be discussed further below, the majority
of the Court agreed that the Judicial Branch has a role in adjudicating
the validity of a President's claim that certain material is too
inflammatory to disclose to the public. The law of prior restraints is
directly applicable to the current debate because the underlying issue,
namely whether certain information should be withheld because of its
inflammatory nature, is the same.
If anything, the justification for granting the President broad
authority to withhold inflammatory nonconfidential information is
more compelling than recognition of an inherent authority to restrain
the publication of national secrets. The information the government
sought to withhold in The Pentagon Papers Case, being previously
secret, provided a meaningful data point in the debate over the
wisdom of the Vietnam conflict. But one need not see a picture of an
Islamic prisoner to intelligently debate the role of torture in the war
on terror; the general facts having already been widely disseminated.
Nonconfidential inflammatory information simply does not implicate
the countervailing constitutional commitment to transparency in
government that animated the ultimate decision in The Pentagon
Papers Case."
Finally, Congress has on any number of occasions accorded the
President substantial deference in determining the kinds of
information that should be protected from disclosure. Given that
there is no statute that specifically allows the President to protect
152. Id. at 730.
153. Id. at 732.
154. See, e.g., id. at 723-24 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("The dominant purpose of the
First Amendment was to prohibit the widespread practice of governmental suppression of
embarrassing information.").
Fall 20101 29
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
inflammatory material, as we have defined it, the Supreme Court has
ruled that the existence of analogous statutes "closely related to the
question of the President's authority in a particular case which ...
evinces legislative intent to accord the President broad discretion may
be considered to 'invite' 'measures on independent presidential
responsibility."""
Such is the case here. In addition to the previously discussed
National Security Exception to FOIA, Congress-as part of the
National Security Act of 1947-has gone so far as to impose an
affirmative obligation on the Director of the CIA to protect
intelligence sources."' The degree of deference that Congress and the
courts have occasionally accorded the Executive is illustrated in the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals opinion, Gardels v. CIA."' The
plaintiff in Gardels requested information from the CIA regarding
contacts it had with individuals employed by the University of
California. Similar to the Abu Ghraib photographs, the fact that the
CIA had covert contacts with universities was in no way secret;
although the details of those contacts remained confidential. The
CIA produced a handful of documents but refused to produce
information detailing specific contacts with university officials. The
government justified withholding the information under the National
Security Exception and the National Security Act of 1947. In support
of its argument, the CIA filed a series of affidavits suggesting that
having to admit contacts with the University of California would
assist hostile foreign nations in identifying individuals who worked
with the CIA and in determining what research projects interested
the Agency. Nor could the CIA deny having made such contacts
because doing so would allow foreign interests to ultimately identify
universities assisting the CIA through a process of elimination.
In deciding the case, the court of appeals dealt with essentially
the same claim presented in ACLU v. DOD. As in ACLU v. DOD,
the plaintiff argued that disclosure should be required because the
Agency could not "prove conclusively" "that disclosure would result
in harm to national security interests.""' The court rejected the
argument, recognizing that "[t]his is necessarily a region for forecasts
155. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678-79 (1981) (citing Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (hereinafter "Youngstown Steel")
(Jackson, J. concurring).
156. 50 U.S.C. § 401 (2010).
157. Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
158. Gardels, 689 F.2d at 1106.
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in which informed judgment as to potential harm should be
respected."159
The analogy to the President Bush and then President Obama's
decision to withhold the Abu Ghraib photographs is striking. True,
neither President could identify a single person or small group that
might be harmed by disclosure of the admittedly inflammatory
pictures; just as the CIA in Gardels could not identify a specific
national secret that might ultimately be revealed by disclosing its
contacts with California universities. Yet, the fact that the CIA had
made "logical" and "plausible" arguments in support of its position
was found to be sufficient to invoke the first and fourth exceptions to
FOIA.6 As stated by the court "it makes good sense" to deny access
based on the admittedly speculative conjecture that disclosure could
harm the public security.
Granted, Gardels dealt with the National Security Exception and
not 7(F). But this is a distinction without substance. The CIA was
justified, according to the court, in withholding the information
because of, inter alia, its statutory obligation to protect foreign
intelligence sources. But the President's justification here, prior to
the passing of the National Security Document Act, for refusing to
turn over the photographs came from an even higher source: his
constitutional duty as Commander in Chief to protect both our armed
forces (specifically) and American lives (generally). Note the
emphasis. The decision here was literally made by the President, not
an administrative agency or military subordinates.162 As such, the
argument for deference has particular force.
Nor is the National Security Exception the only time Congress
and the Judiciary have recognized the President's inherent authority,
outside of FOIA, to limit access to information that could harm
national security interests. Congress, in enacting the Espionage
Act,"' accorded the Executive great deference in determining who
was "lawfully entitled" to receive information related to national
defense. The Espionage Act prohibits individuals from releasing
information "related to the national defense" where the possessor
"has reason to believe" that the information "could be used to the
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1104.
161. Id.
162. See supra note 114.
163. 18 U.S.C. § 793 (2010).
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injury of the United States."' The legislative history of the Act
suggests that Congress afforded the President almost complete
discretionary authority over who should-and should not-receive
such material. As stated by Senator Sutherland, in the course of the
debate over the Act, the President, and not Congress, must determine
who is "lawfully entitled" to obtain documents "because in dealing
with military matters the President has very great power." 165 This
statement reflects the fact that the authors of the Espionage Act
"correctly assumed that the President had the inherent authority to
limit the communication of information relating to the national
defense" and that disclosure would be ultimately determined by rules
and regulations established by the Executive Branch.16
The historic understanding of presidential powers, the Executive
Privilege, the law of prior restraints, the common law State Secrets
Privilege, and even United States v. Nixon all support the recognition
by the courts of a qualified privilege to withhold from disclosure
nonconfidential inflammatory material. The astute observer will
note, however, that the argument relies heavily on cases and
situations that arose before FOIA reached its current iteration. One
logical objection to this analysis would be to argue that Congress, in
enacting and then amending FOIA, essentially eliminated any
constitutionally based privilege by specifically eliminating the
President's ability to control the flow of information absent an
applicable exception. Indeed, the decision in ACLU v. DOD is
premised on the notion that Congress has in fact limited the
President's constitutional power to withhold information to the nine
exceptions enumerated in FOIA.6 1 In the parlance of Justice
Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown Steel, the President is in "tier
three," having been specifically denied the authority under FOIA to
withhold inflammatory, nonconfidential information.'"
This argument has a curbside appeal. As discussed above, FOIA
replaced the broad "public interest" standard for evaluating whether
to disclose with nine specific exemptions. If, the argument goes, the
basis for withholding a document is not specifically on the list, it must
164. Id.
165. 54 CONG. REC. 3489 (1917).
166. United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. Va. 2006).
167. ACLU v. DOD, 543 F.3d at 63.
168. Youngstown Steel, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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be disclosed."'9 At the granular level, ACLU v. DOD was essentially
a debate whether the Law Enforcement Exception of 7(F) could be
extended to cover inflammatory materials like the photographs. The
Second Circuit interpreted the statute as not giving the President this
power, unless the President could identify with particularity a small
group or individual who might be harmed.o
The problem with this approach is that there is no evidence in
the historic record that Congress actually considered what to do
about the release of nonsecret information that is dangerous to life
arising in the context of foreign affairs or war when it adopted
FOIA.'71 The National Security Exception presupposes
confidentiality. The closest we have is Exception 7(F), which suggests
a congressional finding that information arising in (presumably)
domestic criminal investigations should be withheld if release could
reasonably be expected to endanger the safety of "any individual."172
Given the absence of any evidence that Congress specifically
considered the issue, the President at worst finds himself in "tier two"
of Justice Jackson's tripartite system.1 3 If so, section 7(F)'s scope,
namely giving the executive the authority to withhold information to
protect the life of "any individual," can be seen as an implicit
recognition that some information needs to be protected because it
implicates the higher value of protecting human life.
The extant legislative history and numerous cases support this
reading of FOIA. As originally written, the National Security
Exception only required the President to establish that the excluded
information was "specifically required by executive order to be kept
secret in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy.""4
Unlike the current statute, there was no requirement under this
169. Cf Rose, 425 U.S. at 361 (arguing that the exemptions were intended to be
exclusive); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(d) (2010) (providing that the list of exceptions does not
specifically "authorize withholding of information . . . except as specifically stated in this
section." Note that nothing in FOIA, however, purports to interfere with the President's
inherent authority under Article II; nor could it).
170. ACLU v. DOD, 543 F.3d at 74.
171. See supra notes 172-90 and accompanying text.
172. For this reason, among others, Professor Stewart Harris argues, in his recent
article The First Amendment and the End of the World, 68 U. PIrr. L. REV. 785, 816
(2007), that Congress should specifically authorize the President to limit access to what he
calls "catastrophically dangerous information."
173. Youngstown Steel, 343 U.S. at 640 (Jackson, J., concurring).
174. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2010).
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iteration that the decision to classify be "proper.""' In Environmental
Protection Agency v. Mink"' the Court interpreted this language as
greatly circumscribing the Judiciary's role in evaluating secrecy claims
by the executive. According to the Court, "[t]he test [is] simply
whether the President has determined by Executive Order that
particular documents are to be kept secret.""' This was in part
because "the legislative history disposes of any possible argument
that Congress intended [FOIA] to subject executive security
classification to judicial review at the insistence of anyone who might
seek to question them.""' For that reason, the Court in Mink ruled
that the Judiciary's role in reviewing a claim under the National
Security Exception was limited to ensuring that the procedural
requirements for classifying a particular document as confidential had
been followed.'79 Given its limited role, the Court ruled that it had no
authority to review the challenged documents in-camera, which
would force courts to second-guess the Executive's determination.
Congress reacted negatively to the constricted role the Court
carved for itself in Mink.'8" In 1974, Congress amended the National
Security Exception to require both that the exempted material be
classified pursuant to an Executive Order and that the classification
"in fact [be] properly classified."'" In practical terms, this
amendment gave courts the authority to conduct in-camera reviews
and make an independent determination of whether national defense
and security interests require a particular document to remain
confidential.'" Setting aside for a moment the question of whether
the amendment unconstitutionally infringes on the President's foreign
175. See infra note 184.
176. Mink, 410 U.S. at 81-83, superseded by statute, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(4)(B), 552(b)(1)
(1975), as recognized in Phillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009, 1012 n.4 (9th Cir. 1976).
177. Id. at 82.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 84. Justices Harlan, Burger and Blackmun took a similar perspective in The
Pentagon Papers Case, 403 U.S. at 756, concluding that the role federal judiciary in
evaluating an effort by the President to restrain the publication of inflammatory material
be limited to ensuring that foreign affairs issues were implicated by the material and the
proper executive officer had made the determination that confidentiality was necessary.
180. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(4)(B), 552(b)(1) (1975) (narrowing the Supreme Court's
interpretation).
181. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2010). For a detailed discussion of the history of the
National Security Exception, see Amanda Fitzsimmons, National Security or Unnecessary
Secrecy? Restricting Exemption 1 to Prohibit Reclassification of Information Already in the
Public Domain, 4 I/S J. LAW & POL'Y 479 (2008).
182. ACLU v. DOD, 543 F. 3d. at 76.
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affair and war powers, courts have interpreted the amended provision
as authorizing, but not requiring, an in-camera review of documents
designated confidential by the Executive."'
Congress recognized in enacting the 1974 amendments that "the
Executive Departments responsible for national defense and foreign
policy matters have unique insights into what adverse affects [ ]might
occur as a result of public disclosure of a particular classified
record."'m As such, Congress indicated that the' role of federal courts
should be limited to examining the "reasonableness" and "propriety"
of the President's decision and not to engage in an "extensive"
reweighing of the issues at stake.m For that reason, courts have
traditionally "accord[ed] substantial weight to an agency affidavit
concerning the details of the classified status of a disputed record.",116
In light of this history, FOIA can be interpreted as merely providing
federal courts with a roadmap on how to evaluate confidentiality
claims by the executive, and not as supplanting his inherent
constitutional authority.
All of this begs an even more important question: Given the
historical recognition of a broad Presidential privilege, does Congress
have the power in the first instance to eliminate the President's
authority to restrict the release of information harmful to American
interests, at least in regards to information related to foreign affairs
and war? To draw an analogy from Near, could Congress require the
President to publish the "number and location of [American]
troops?"",
The debate over presidential powers in the context of the "war
on terror" has been ably covered by any number of commentators.
A brief discussion of the various perspectives, however, illustrates
183. Canning v. Dep't of Justice, 848 F. Supp. 1037 (D.D.C. 1994) (denying motion for
in-camera review where the Vaughn affidavits submitted by the government were
sufficiently detailed to make a determination of the propriety of the classification and
where there was no evidence of bad faith.).
184. S. REP. No. 93-1200 (1974) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG & ADMIN
NEWS, 93rd Cong., 6267, 6290 (1974).
185. Id. at 6273.
186. Salisbury v. United States, 690 F.2d 966, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
187. Near, 283 U.S. at 631 ("No one would question but that the government might
prevent .. . the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of
troops.").
188. See, e.g., SCHLESINGER, supra note 137; David J. Barron & Martin Lederman,
The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb - A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 941 (2008); Sarah M. Riley, Constitutional Crisis or Deja Vu, The War Power, the
Bush Administration and the War on Terror, 45 DUQUESNE L. Rev. 702 (2007).
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that irrespective of what theory of presidential power is followed, a
court considering an effort by the executive to suppress the
dissemination of inflammatory material must accord substantial-if
not complete-deference in the context of an ongoing armed conflict.
This is true irrespective whether the decision to withhold is
considered in the context of FOIA or as an independent exercise of
the President's Article II war and foreign affairs powers.
The balance of power between Congress, the courts and the
President in responding to hostile threats was described by Chief
Justice Rehnquist as the "most difficult area of all of the
Constitution."'89 This difficulty is reflected in the famous Youngstown
Steel case, which spawned seven different opinions and in which no
single coherent theory of presidential power commanded a
majority.'" The Court"s inability to articulate a standard reflects the
ongoing, underlying debate over the tension between the President's
authority as Commander-in-Chief and the collection of war powers
accorded Congress under Article One."' Although the legal
cognoscente has articulated any number of theories to shed light into
this twilight zone, most fall into one of two overlapping categories.
A. 'The Preclusive Executive'
At one extreme of the continuum, President Truman argued at
the district court level in Youngstown Steel that his power to save the
nation from a (perceived) catastrophe was "checked" only by
impeachment or electoral defeat. When asked whether such
expansive power would extend to allowing the president to seize
newspapers and radio stations in a time of crisis, Truman purportedly
replied "[u]nder similar circumstances the President of the United
States has to act for whatever is for the best of the Country. That's
the answer." 9 2
This position, which Truman abandoned when the case was
argued to the Supreme Court, is a variation on the theme "Salus
populi suprema lex" or "let the good of the people be the supreme
law." This notion is deeply rooted in American political philosophy.
Locke, who had perhaps more influence on the founders than any
189. Barron & Lederman, supra note 188, at 1069.
190. Youngstown Steel, 343 U.S. 579.
191. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cls. 11-16.
192. SCHLESINGER, supra note 137, at 143. Thomas Jefferson, among others, invoked
the salus populi doctrine to support, among other things, the Louisiana Purchase. See also
Yoo, supra note 121.
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other political philosopher, wrote in his Second Treatise of
Government that there would be times of emergency when "the laws
themselves should ... give way to the executive power, or rather to
this fundamental law of nature and government .... [t]hat as much as
may be, all the members of society are to be preserved."' 3 Locke
took this position to the extreme, arguing that in times of imminent
hostile threat, the Executive must have the inherent power to "to act
according to discretion for the public good, without the prescription
of laws and sometimes even against it."9
The concept of the "Preclusion" or "Unitary" Executive reached
its pinnacle during the Civil War. Abraham Lincoln played on this
theme in his first address to Congress after he had unilaterally
suspended the writ of habeas corpus and authorized marital law
following the bombing of Fort Sumter.' Lincoln justified his extra-
constitutional actions by arguing that "these measures, whether
strictly legal or not, were ventured upon under what appeared to be a
popular demand and a public necessity, trusting then, as now, that
Congress would readily ratify them. It is believed that nothing has
been done beyond the constitutional competency of Congress." 196
Despite Lincoln's conciliatory gesture towards Congress
("trusting" that Congress would ratify his acts) he recognized the very
questionable legality of the steps he took, justifying them as being
"demand[ed] by public necessity."'97
Many of President Bush's actions in prosecuting the "War on
Terror" were based on the "Preclusive Executive" theory of
presidential power. At one time or another, the Bush Administration
defended "enhanced" interrogation techniques, warrantless
wiretapping, rendition, and any number of the acts taken during the
"War on Terror" on the theory that the President's war and foreign
affairs powers included "all that is necessary and proper for carrying
those powers into execution."'9 8 In defending the Administration's
secret warrantless wiretapping program, launched shortly after the
193. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 421 (1960) (emphasis added).
194. Id.
195. Abraham Lincoln, Special Session Message to Congress (July 4, 1861), 7 COMP.
MESSAGES & PAPERS PRES. N.S. XXVI, 1897, 3225.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT (2006) (quoting
Johnson v. Eisenstranger, 339 U.S. 763, 788 (1950)).
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9/11 attacks, then-Attorney General Albert Gonzalez argued that the
President's "chief responsibility under the Constitution to protect
America from attack" gave him all authority available under the
Constitution "to protect the people of the United States"'9
irrespective of congressional approval or disapproval.
Applying this view of presidential power leads to but a single
conclusion. Irrespective of any congressional action, including FOIA,
the President's decision that dissemination of certain material could
lead to direct harm to the 'Nation's foreign affairs and military must
be given virtually preclusive effect by the courts. This is particularly
true when there is no evidence that the material is being withheld for
any reason other than to protect those legitimate interests.
B. 'Presidential Default Powers'
Truman argued for a more nuanced approach when Youngstown
Steel reached the Supreme Court. Abandoning the notion that the
only check on the President's emergency powers was impeachment or
elections, he argued instead that the aggregate of the President's
constitutional powers authorized him to act until such time that
Congress passed legislation preventing him from going any further.
Indeed, after seizing the steel mills, Truman's communicated to
Congress that he would reverse his decision if directed to do so.20
This "default theory" of Presidential powers recognizes that
Congress has broad authority to limit the President's power as
Commander in Chief pursuant to the various Article I "war powers"
granted to Congress. Until Congress acts, however, the President
maintains broad authority to take whatever actions he or she sees fit
in responding to hostile threats.201
Proponents of this theory generally recognize that there remains
a "core" of Commander in Chief powers on which Congress cannot
intrude. As Yale Law Professor-and former President-William
Howard Taft wrote in an influential 1916 law review article: "[w]hen
it comes to the power of the President as Commander-in-Chief it
seems perfectly clear that Congress could not order battles to be
199. Id. at 2.
200. SCHLESINGER, supra note 137, at 143.
201. For a more detailed discussion of the "Default Theory" of Presidential Powers,
see Sarah M Riley, Constitutional Crisis or Dijd Vu? The War Power, the Bush
Administration and the War on Terror, 45 DUQ. L. REV. 701 (2006).
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fought on a certain plan, and could not direct parts of the army to be
moved from one part of the country to another."2
Few would argue that protecting the lives of American soldiers
and the American populace from foreign threats lies outside the
"core" of presidential powers. As Alexander Hamilton argues in
Federalist 70, expansive presidential power is essential, inter alia, "to
the protection of the community against foreign attacks" and to the
"security of liberty against the ... assaults of ambition, of faction and
of anarchy." 203 Hamilton made the same point more specifically in
Federalist 23, where he observed "it must be admitted, as a necessary
consequence, that there can be no limitation [on presidential]
authority, which is to provide for the defence and protection of the
community, in any matter essential to it efficacy." 204 Recognition of
202. William Howard Taft, The Boundaries Between the Executive, the Legislative and
Judicial Branches of the Government, 25 YALE L.J. 599, 610 (1916). A third theory, now
thoroughly discredited, suggests that President has no independent war powers and must
rely exclusively on delegated authority from Congress when engaging foreign threats.
That view was seemingly laid to rest by The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1863). This case was
brought by the owners of four merchant ships whose vessels were seized. The ship owners
challenged President Lincoln's unilateral imposition of a blockade on southern ports.
Among the arguments made by the ship owners was that the President lacked the
unilateral power to either seize the ships or to impose a blockade absent congressional
approval. Congress had not authorized the blockade at the time the seizures took place
but later passed legislation approving the President's actions. The government contended
that, by necessity, the President must be accorded emergency powers to respond to
belligerent acts because "[iJf it be not so, there is no protection of the state." Id. at 660.
The Court, in a 5 to 4 decision, agreed:
If a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not
only authorized but bound to resist force by force. He does not initiate
the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any
special legislative authority. And whether the hostile party be a foreign
invader or States organized in rebellion, it is nonetheless a war
although the declaration of it be "unilateral."
Id. at 668 (emphasis omitted). The Court's decision in The Prize Cases is generally
interpreted today as a complete repudiation of the notion that the President lacks
unilateral authority to take action he or she deems necessary to protect the Country from
hostile threats. See, e.g., YOO, supra note 121, at 212-14.
203. THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton).
204. THE FEDERALIST No. 23 (Alexander Hamilton); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507, 580 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The national security, after all, is the
primary responsibility and purpose of the Federal Government." (citations omitted) "The
Founders intended the President have the primary responsibility-along with the
necessary power-to protect the national security .... ); THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 385
(Alexander Hamilton) (the President has broad discretion to protect national security
because "[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the
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this power and responsibility, forms the foundation upon which the
Executive Privilege,20 the State Secrets privilege,2% and even the law
of prior restraints,207 were constructed. Accordingly, one does not
have to be a proponent of the "Unitary Executive" Theory of
presidential power to recognize that the Executive has some, limited
authority to prevent disclosure of nonconfidential material that could
have immediate harmful repercussions if released.
VI. Adopting the Proper Standard for Evaluating the
President's Authority to Withhold Inflammatory Material from
Disclosure
Roughly balanced against the President's inherent authority to
protect the United States from the danger that could be created by
the untimely release of inflammatory material is the commitment
reflected in FOIA, among other places, to transparency. And
although the First Amendment standing alone does not serve as a
constitutional freedom of information act, assuring open
communication on matters relating to functioning of government is
clearly an important aspect of that Amendment.2 m The solution, as it
is with any privilege, is the adoption of a test that ensures only
material that is legitimately "harmful" is protected. Otherwise, such a
privilege could easily be abused to shield the government from public
scrutiny of wrongdoing or illegality.
In formulating the contours of any such privilege, two strands
can be derived from case law arising under the First Amendment, the
acts of Congress and, to a lesser extent, the manner in which
Presidents have historically interpreted their "duty of disclosure."
First, the decision whether inflammatory material should be
suppressed turns on the seriousness of the harm that could result. In
terms of FOIA, Congress has essentially made the decision that two
kinds of harm (in general) warrant suppression: the possible death of
"any individual" from the release of law enforcement material
proceedings of one man, in a much more eminent degree, than the proceedings of any
greater number.").
205. See supra notes 133-137 and text accompanying
206. See supra note 142.
207. See supra notes 146-55 and text accompanying.
208. See generally Richmond Newspapers, Inc., v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
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(Exception 7(F))2 and "confidential" material that could hamper the
security apparatus' efforts to protect American lives and interests
(the National Security Exception).
The Supreme Court has essentially agreed that the level of
danger presented by disclosure is highly relevant under cases arising
under the First Amendment. Hence, in the Dennis reformulation of
the "clear and present danger" test, the Court ruled that the decision
whether to punish inflammatory speech must turn on the "gravity of
the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability[.]" 2 10  Justices Brennan,
Harlan, Burger, Blackmun and perhaps Stewart made a similar point
in the previously discussed The Pentagon Papers, arguing that the
decision whether the publication of confidential information can be
restrained turned on whether the disclosure would "immediately
cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety of a
transport already at sea[.]"211
In evaluating the level of potential harm, the same separation of
powers concerns that animate the need for a privilege in the first
place would require a court to give the Executive's determination
great deference.212 Such deference is already given under FOIA in
cases challenging 'Executive Branch decisions to classify documents.
As stated by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, because courts have
"little expertise in either international diplomacy or
counterintelligence operations, [courts] ... are in no position to
209. The desire to avoid harm animates Exception 7(F). This exception as originally
adopted only protected from disclosure information that "would" "endanger the life or
physical safety of law enforcement personnel." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F) (2010). This
limitation proved inadequate because it allowed for the release of information that could
result in harm to witnesses, potential witnesses and even family members of individuals
working for or with law enforcement personnel. 131 Cong. Rec S253 (Daily Ed. Jan. 3
1985) (statement of Carol E. Dinkins, Deputy Attorney General). Fear that the criminal
element could use FOIA to identify and then retaliate against such individuals motivated
two changes in the then existing language of 7(F). First, the phrase "would endanger" was
replaced with the more generous "could reasonably be expected" language. Second, the
exemption was expanded to cover "any individual" and not just "law enforcement
personnel." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F) (2010).
210. Dennis v United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
211. The Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 726-27 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice
Harlan writing in dissent makes the point more directly, asking "[w]hether the
unauthorized disclosure of any of these particular documents would seriously impair
national security." Id. at 754 (Harlan, J. dissenting).
212. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001) (recognizing that
"heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches" must be given in a
situation involving "terrorism or other special circumstances"); Dep't of the Navy v. Egan,
484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) (recognizing the Judiciary's traditional hesitancy to "intrude upon
the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs").
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dismiss the CIA's facially reasonable concerns" about the harm that
disclosure could cause to national security."'
But the nature and level of harm is only part of the equation.
Second, equally important in evaluating whether suppression is
warranted under either the Constitution or FOIA is the question of
motive. One of the overriding purposes of FOIA was to prevent the
government from withholding relevant information merely to avoid
embarrassment or, more perniciously, to hide government
wrongdoing. At the macro level, the challenge in many FOIA cases is
distinguishing between refusals to disclose motivated by the
legitimate concerns of national security or safety and those motivated
by a base desire to hide government wrongdoing. More than
anything else, Congress replaced the APA with FOIA to remove
from administrative agencies the unfettered authority to withhold
documents "only to cover up embarrassing mistakes or
irregularities.""
This desire to limit government's ability to withhold information
simply because it is embarrassing also has a constitutional dimension,
in that one of the values embodied by the First Amendment is to
foster informed public debate.2 15 As stated by Justice Douglas, this
can only be accomplished by interpreting the First Amendment as
prohibiting the "widespread [pre-FOIA] practice of government
suppression of embarrassing information."21 Or, as stated by
Professor Geoffrey Stone, "[w]hat would it mean to say that citizens
are 'self governing' if their government can constitutionally censor
publications in order to hide from them its own deceit about matters
of fundamental national importance?",17  Underlying both of these
213. Frugone v. CIA, 169 F.3d 772, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (illustrating the requirement
that courts show great deference to the Executive flows directly from the President's
virtually unitary authority over foreign affairs). See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright,
299 U.S. 304 (1936). The last branch that should be second guessing the President is the
Judicial, which has been vested with essentially no power in the area of foreign affairs.
See, e.g., Wolf v. CIA, 357 F.Supp. 2d 112, 116 (D.D.C. 2004) (reviewing a classification
court said "little more" is required "than a showing that the agency's rationale is logical"),
aff'd in part, 473 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
214. S. REP. No. 89-813 (1965).
215. See, e.g., N. Y. Times Co., v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268-79 (1964) (finding the
First Amendment "'fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social change desired by the people') (quoting Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
216. N. Y. Times Co., v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 723-24 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
217. STONE, supra note 25, at 519-20.
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iterations of the underlying constitutional value is the issue of
governmental motive. To the extent one agrees that there are
legitimate reasons to suppress information, by definition the decision
whether such suppression is justified requires the Court to consider
the motives of the decision maker. A decision to suppress motivated
solely or predominately by a "legitimate" concern (such as public
safety) does not implicate the First Amendment value of preventing
government deception. In plain language, under the First
Amendment, the decision to allow speech to be restrained must be
based, at least in part, on the motive of the censor.
This focus on "motive" is even more pronounced under FOIA.
Courts interpreting the FOIA exceptions-including the Second
Circuit in ACLU v. DOD-have repeatedly emphasized the
distinction between decisions to suppress made in "good faith" and
those intended to do little more than prevent government agencies
from being embarrassed. 2 18 In Goldberg v. Department of State,219 to
cite one of many examples, the Court opined that its role was not only
to ensure that the information being withheld was properly classified
pursuant to an executive order, but also to ensure that the
information was not being classified "in order to conceal violation of
law [or] to prevent embarrassment to an ... agency." 220
This distinction is essentially baked into the test applied by the
majority of courts in evaluating claims made under the National
Security and Law Enforcement Exceptions. The rules, as first
discussed in the oft-cited case Vaughn v. Rosen221' require an agency to
first undertake a thorough search for responsive documents. The
documents being withheld must be identified with "reasonable
specificity" and the claim of exemption must be justified with a
relatively "detailed analysis."2 22 In the majority of cases, this burden
is met through the filing of affidavits from the responsible
government officials justifying why a particular document falls within
an exceptionf' 3
218. See, e.g,. Arar v Ashcroft, 585 F.3d. 559, 614 (2d Cir. 2009); Mohammed v.
Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d. 992, 1007 n.7 (9th Cir. 2009); McDonnell v. United
States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1245 (3d Cir. 1993).
219. Goldberg v. Dep't of State, 818 F.2d 71 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
220. Id. at 77.
221. Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
222. King v. Dep't of Justice, 830 F.2d 210, 214, 217 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
223. Id.
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Upon the filing of this affidavit, known as a Vaughn affidavit, the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to "make a showing of bad faith on the
part of the agency sufficient to impugn the agency's affidavits ... or
provide some tangible evidence that an exemption claimed by the
agency should not apply."2 4  The declarations submitted by the
agency are "accorded a presumption of good faith,"22' and a court is
obligated to give "substantial weight to an agency's affidavit
concerning the details of the classified status of the disputed
record." 2 6  Even the fact that the produced documents reference
documents not produced is insufficient to overcome the presumption
of good faith.227
Similar rules apply to Exemption 7(C), which allows law
enforcement agencies to withhold documents that "could reasonably
be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy[.]" 22 To overcome the privacy protection afforded by this
exception, an applicant must show "compelling evidence that the
agency denying the FOIA request is engaged in illegal activity, and
access to the [information] is necessary in order to confirm or refute
that evidence."2 29 Although the specific test applied under Exception
7(C) is different than that of other exceptions, courts in all cases have
recognized that the decision whether information should be disclosed
turns on, inter alia, the government's motive.
Executive orders implementing FOIA likewise distinguish
between legitimate suppression of information and those motivated
by a desire to hide wrongdoing. The Executive branch's perspective
is perhaps best evidenced by the manner in which sitting Presidents
have interpreted the National Security Exception.o This provision
allows the executive to withhold information that "must be kept
224. Carney v. Dep't of Justice, 19 F.3d 897, 912 (2d Cir. 1993).
225. Id.
226. Miller v. Casey, 730 F.2d 773, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
227. Ground Saucer Watch, Inc. v. CIA, 692 F.2d 770 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
228. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2010).
229. SafeCard Serv., Inc., v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1205-06 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Perhaps
the most famous case applying this exception was Accuracy in Media v. Nat'l Park Serv.,
194 F.3d 120 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The plaintiff sought the release of crime scene photographs
taken of White House Counsel Vincent Foster, who had committed suicide in a national
park. The court ruled that slight discrepancies in the way wounds were described in
various investigatory reports was insufficient to show "compelling evidence" of
government wrongdoing sufficient to overcome the presumption of good faith.
230. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2010).
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secret in the interest of national security" so long as the classification
is authorized (1) "under criteria established by an Executive order"
and (2) "the resulting classification is "proper." 231 As early as 1972,
the implementing order signed by President Nixon mandated that
"[iln no case shall information be classified ... to conceal inefficiency
or administrative error, [or] to prevent embarrassment to a person or
[d]epartment."232 This same language was adopted in a subsequent
Executive Order issued by President Reagan in 1982.233 Most
recently, President Bush's 2003 Executive Order implementing the
National Security Exception likewise prohibited classifications for the
purpose of "conceal[ing] violations of law, inefficiency or
administrative error."a This most recent order also reiterated that
material cannot be classified merely to "prevent embarrassment to a
person, organization or agency."2
Congress, the courts and even the Executive branch have
interpreted FOIA (at one level) and the Constitution (at another) as
recognizing the balance between the need for public security and the
values advanced by public disclosure. Existing case law and the
legislative history of FOIA suggests that determining which of these
values is paramount when the Executive seeks to avoid disclosure
turns on two variables: The potential danger of the information for
which disclosure is sought and the Executive's motive for denying
production. Applying this same test when evaluating a claim made
under the President's inherent constitutional authority to protect the
nation from harm is warranted because the constitutional values and
those embodied by FOIA are identical. Every iteration of the State
Secrets Privilege, the Executive Privilege and even the law of prior
restraints seeks to balance security with transparency. The same is
true of FOIA.
Application of this test to the Abu Ghraib photographs leads to
the inescapable conclusion that the Second Circuit erred in ordering
their release. Turning first to the question of motive, the Presidents'
refusal to release the photographs simply did not implicate the
overriding concern of an agency using secrecy to hide evidence of
unproven government wrongdoing or to otherwise avoid
231. Id.
232. Exec. Order No. 11,652, 3 C.F.R. 154 (1972).
233. Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1982).
234. Exec. Order No. 13,292, 3 C.F.R 196 (2004).
235. Id.
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embarrassment. By definition, the "information" sought-that the
detainees were badly abused by the government-is in no way secret.
The world has known that individuals were tortured by the United
States government since at least the 2004 publication of the New York
Times and Washington Post articles."' That information has
subsequently been widely disseminated on television, radio, the
internet and print media. Indeed, over 279 photographs and
numerous videotapes photos showing similar conduct have already
been published.3'
Given that the information contained in the Abu Ghraib
photographs was in no way secret, the primary motivating principles
underlying our constitutional commitment to transparency were also
not implicated. Applying the "purity of purpose test" described
above has particular resonance here, when the leadership or
administration responsible for the "embarrassing mistake" is different
from the one advocating nondisclosure. Certainly, if it were President
Bush and his Administration-which, at some level, were responsible
for the torture depicted on these pictures-championing the
withholding of the information, their motivation could be questioned.
Here, of course, the Obama Administration has every reason to
discredit the Bush Administration, if for no other reason than base
political advantage. Simply put, the Obama Administration has
nothing tangible to gain at least in terms of political capital by
withholding the pictures.
In light of the lack of political advantage to be gained by denying
access to the photographs, the justifications for the decision given by
President Obama238  and General Myers essentially stand
unchallenged. Indeed, the Second Circuit assumed that those
justifications, e.g., the release of the photographs would result in the
death of Americans, were in fact true.239 This consideration, in turn,
largely answers the "level of harm" prong of the proposed test.2 40 As
236. See supra notes 61-66 and text accompanying.
237. See supra note 101.
238. See supra note 93.
239. See supra note 95.
240. There is a stark contrast between the issues confronting the court in ACLU v
DOD and the situation presented in The Pentagon Papers. Given the historical nature of
The Pentagon Papers, and the fact that the Nixon Administration was at that time
widening the Vietnam conflict, there was every reason to be suspicious of the justifications
proffered by the President for seeking suppression. Hence, applying the proposed test, a
court would be justified in ordering the release of The Pentagon Papers, and not the Abu
Ghraib photographs.
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discussed above, the 'courts considering the Abu Ghraib photographs
either ignored the question or assumed that harm would occur but
that our commitment to transparency "outweighed" the deaths of few
unidentified individuals. But therein lies the problem and the
springboard for the final consideration. The courts in the Second
Circuit chose to order the release of the material in almost complete
disregard of our constitutional structure, which mandates that the
President's determination on issues of national security must be given
substantial deference, particularly when there is purity in his
241purpose.
The President, in good faith, told the court of his legitimate and
even unchallenged reasons why he was refusing to release the
photographs. His decision has particular resonance because the value
of transparency is advanced little by rehashing that which has already
been revealed, discussed, dissected and widely disseminated. He
determined, without any serious objection, that releasing the
photographs would harm national security, an area in which the court
has neither constitutional prerogative nor expertise. In any case
where there is purity of purpose coupled with a colorable claim of
potential harm to Americans, courts must defer to that
determination.
Conclusion
No democracy can operate in secrecy. But when democracy is
challenged by an intractable foreign enemy, our constitutional
structure makes clear that the role of the courts is necessarily limited.
When purpose is pure, and the underlying issue at hand has been fully
explicated, the President and not the courts should be the final arbiter
of when inflammatory but nonconfidential information should be
released. At the risk of overstating the case, a picture may be worth a
thousand words. But is it worth a thousand lives? One hundred
lives? One life? At the end of the day, the President and not the
courts, has the constitutional prerogative to make that decision.
241. As stated by the court in McGhee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1983),
courts must "accord substantial weight" to classifications that touch upon national security
because "the Executive departments responsible for national defense and foreign policy
matters have unique insights into what adverse [e]ffects might occur as a result of
particular classified record."
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